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Failure to Launch
Canadian Federal Government Attempts at
Memorialising the Second World War, 1945-1967
THOMAS M. LIT TLEWO OD
Abstract : Between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1960s,
the Canadian federal government made several attempts to commemorate
and memorialise those who died during the war. Despite strong
government support and advocacy from the Royal Canadian Legion,
the Canadian population did not believe that building a new memorial
was a wise expenditure of taxpayer money. This article uses newspaper
records, The Legionary and government documents to examine how
successive federal governments tried and failed to commemorate and
memorialise the Second World War with a national war memorial. This
article also problematises the current understanding of how the Second
World has been remembered in Canada. The current historiographical
understanding of Canadian Second World War memory suggests that
the country has done a poor job commemorating the dead of that war.
However, the lack of traditional memorials and monuments does not
necessarily indicate that the Second World War has gone unremembered,
but that conceptualisations of memory need to be expanded to take stock
of the commemorative landscape.

O

22 august 1945, urban planner Jacques Gréber received a
telegram from Alphonse Fournier, the Minister of Public Works
in William Lyon Mackenzie King’s government, asking Gréber to
redesign the city of Ottawa. The telegram read, in part:
n

IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER MEMORIAL OF THE WAR JUST
ENDED THE GOVERNMENT HAS APPROVED FURTHER
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DEVELOPMENT OF CANADA’S NATIONAL CAPITAL AND ITS
ENVIRONMENT ON BOTH SIDES OF THE OTTAWA RIVER1

The intent behind the urban plan was explicit: King wanted
Canada’s capital to be transformed into a memorial to the Second
World War. Gréber set to work and was given a wide mandate, a
large budget and significant personnel resources to draft a plan for
the future of the capital region. Published in 1950, Gréber’s plan
was a comprehensive redesign of the national capital region which
sought to improve public transportation, greenspace and traffic
problems. He wanted Canada’s capital to rival international capitals
like Washington D.C., London and Paris.2
To make the connection between the plan’s memorial purpose and
commemoration of Canada’s role in the Second World War, Gréber
suggested a Vimy-like memorial on the Gatineau Hills overlooking
Parliament. King loved the idea and wanted Gréber to get started
on the memorial before the report was even published.3 However,
the memorial never broke ground, despite many of Gréber’s urban
development proposals (such as greenspace, transit and roadways)
being implemented.4 The Gatineau Hills memorial was but one
of several memorial proposals in the 1950s and 1960s that never
materialised. Each one of these proposed memorialisations shows that
Canadian governments, both Liberal and Conservative, considered
commemorating the Second World War an important way by which
they could frame and solidify Canadian postwar identity. While
governments supported these memorials, the public, generally, did
not, which meant that no traditional Second World War memorial
was ever built. However, attempts by different federal governments to
memorialise the Second World War were a means to promote national
identity in a time that was crucial to Canadian nation building.
Canadians did remember the Second World War, but commemoration
manifested in a more abstract way. Newspaper articles, documents

Jacques Gréber, Plan for the National Capital General Report (Ottawa: National
Capital Planning Service, 1950), 1.
2  
David Gordon, “Weaving a Modern Plan for Canada’s Capital: Jacques Gréber
and the 1950 Plan for the National Capital Region,” Urban History Review 29, 2
(March 2001): 45.
3  
William Lyon Mackenzie King Diaries [WLMK Diaries], 19 March 1948, 3-4,
Library and Archives Canada [LAC].
4  
Gréber, Plan for the National Capital General Report.
1  
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from the Royal Canadian Legion and letters to political officials all
suggest that Canadians remembered the Second World War through
the lens of the First and that the absence of a standalone memorial
did not indicate a lack of commemoration of the past.
Much of the historiographical understanding of commemoration
of warfare is concentrated on the First World War. Initiated in 1975
by Paul Fussell’s book The Great War and Modern Memory, the
historiography of First World War memory focuses on the war’s
relationship to modernity. In the Canadian context, the debate about
the legacy of the First World War has focused on whether Canada
emerged out of the war as a ‘new,’ united country. Jonathan F. Vance
shows that Canadian communities chose to memorialise the war in
a chiefly local fashion, using victorious and triumphant imagery and
statuary which breathed life into the country and gave “birth to a
national consciousness that would carry the country to the heights of
achievement.”5 First World War memorials portrayed the nationalist
myth of heroic sacrifice, often symbolised in depictions of crucifixion
motifs and crosses of sacrifice.6 The nationalist myth has been
questioned by historians such as Denise Thomson, Alan Gordon and
Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, who all argue that there is much more
room for nuance in the discussion of nationalist commemoration.7
Though commemoration of the Second World War is far less wellunderstood, a review of what literature exists shows that the themes
that dominate the discussions of the memory of the First World War

5  
Jonathan F. Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War
(Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 1997), 11. See also Paul Fussell,
The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975);
and Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern
Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989).
6  
Alan R. Young, “‘We Throw the Torch’: Canadian Memorials of the Great War
and the Mythology of Heroic Sacrifice,” Journal of Canadian Studies 24, 4 (Winter
1989): 18.
7  
Denise Thomson, “National Sorrow, National Pride: Commemoration of War
in Canada, 1918-1945,” Journal of Canadian Studies 30, 4 (Winter 1995-96): 5;
Alan Gordon, “Lest We Forget: Two Solitudes in War and Memory,” in Canadas of
the Mind: The Making and Unmaking of Canadian Nationalisms in the Twentieth
Century, ed. Norman Hillmer and Adam Chapnick (Montreal & Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2007), 159–73; and Ian McKay and Jamie Swift, The Vimy
Trap: Or, How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Great War (Toronto:
Between the Lines, 2017).
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were not present after 1945.8 For example, by the end of the Second
World War there could be no doubt that Canada had been thrust
into the modern world. One aspect of the historiography of war
commemoration, however, does remain constant: national identities,
contexts, literatures and experiences of war were crucial to how
Canadians remembered past conflicts. Politicians and the political
elite used wars to promote national ideals and unifying principles and
those ideals and principles shaped the practice of commemoration.
Furthermore, national contexts shaped the nature of the scholarship
in each nation.
In 2020, noted Canadian historian Tim Cook published The
Fight for History in which he recounts some of the various ways
Canadians have and have not remembered the Second World War.
It is the only book-length consideration of Second World War
commemoration in Canada. His chief argument is that, though
Canadians made a significant contribution to the Allied victory in
the Second World War, the “war faded rapidly from social memory”
after the conflict’s end.9 No war memorial to the Second World War
was ever built, few major films or television series were created and
stories of the First World War dominated the narratives of Canada’s
wartime experience. Critical to Cook’s argument is that the general
public did not know what its fellow Canadians did during the war,
despite a tenth of the country’s population having served in uniform
during between 1939 and 1945.10 This article suggests that it is

8  
Tim Cook, The Fight for History: 75 Years of Forgetting, Remembering, and
Remaking Canada’s Second World War (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2020); Malcolm
Ferguson, “Canada’s Response: The Making and Remaking of the National War
Memorial” (MA Thesis, Carleton University, 2012); Alan Gordon, “Lest We Forget:
Two Solitudes in War and Memory,” in Canadas of the Mind: The Making and
Unmaking of Canadian Nationalisms in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman Hillmer
and Adam Chapnick (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007),
159–73; Keir Reeves et al., eds., Battlefield Events: Landscape, Commemoration and
Heritage (Oxford: Routledge, 2016); Matt Symes, “The Personality of Memory: The
Process of Informal Commemoration in Normandy,” in Canada and the Second World
War: Essays in Honour of Terry Copp, ed. Geoffrey Hayes, Michael Bechthold and
Matt Symes (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2012), 443–60; Jonathan F.
Vance, “An Open Door to a Better Future: The Memory of Canada’s Second World
War,” in Canada and the Second World War: Essays in Honour of Terry Copp,
ed. Geoffrey Hayes, Mike Bechthold and Matt Symes (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier
University Press, 2012), 461–79.
9  
Cook, The Fight for History, 10.
10  
Cook, The Fight for History, 3-4.
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unnecessary to know exactly what happened during a war to be
able to commemorate it. Regardless if one knew the details or even
the broad strokes of what happened during the Second World War,
standing in silence at cenotaph ceremonies and keeping the memories
of those who died during the war was commemoration. While there
was no national war memorial to the Second World War, the conflict
featured prominently in postwar Remembrance Day ceremonies and
it is clear that Canadians did remember service members’ efforts
and sacrifices over the four and a half years of the war. For example,
battles of the Second World War were prominent in newspaper
coverage of Remembrance Day ceremonies across the country in the
years following the war.11
Cook argues that postwar Canadians did not know about the
country’s war efforts and what Canadian service members did
overseas. He suggests that the general Canadian population had a
better understanding of what happened during the First World War.
Indeed, Vimy was commemorated in the interwar period as Canada’s
birthplace.12 Cook also notes that Canadians’ understanding of that
conflict was, and continues to be, warped by romantic notions of
nationhood, independence and unity.13 Myths are not reflective of a
lack of memory and indeed all collective memory is mythologised to a
degree. This is the very nature of memory and is what distinguishes
commemoration from history.
History and memory are in many cases diametrically opposed.
For Pierre Nora, the foremost theorist of history and memory, memory
is magical in that it only includes those facts which suit it. Memory is
created by those communities that develop and shape it, not by the
societies it purports to remember. It “installs remembrance within the
sacred” and takes root in particular spaces, rituals and objects.14 What
this rather ethereal definition does not touch on is that commemoration
and memory are not analogous. Commemoration, particularly in the

11  
“Veterans of Two Wars Being Honored on Remembrance Day,” Ottawa Journal,
11 October 1945; “Veterans of Two Wars Pay Tribute to Fallen,” Vancouver Daily
Province, 13 November 1945; “Former Chaplain Asks Renewed Fight on Evils,”
Calgary Herald, 12 November 1946; and “The Dutch Do Not Forget,” Ottawa
Citizen, 12 November 1947.
12  
Cook, Fighting for History, 422-23.
13  
Tim Cook, Vimy: The Battle and the Legend (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2017), 218-48.
14  
Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” trans. Marc
Roudebush, Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 8-9.
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case of war, encompasses the formal and informal acts of joining with
fellow citizens to pay public tribute to the activities and sacrifices of
service members. Often commemoration takes place in the rites and
rituals of Remembrance Day, but commemoration can also be the
socio-cultural notion of grouping together to bear in mind preceding
generations. Often, these rites and rituals take place at memorials
or monuments and those objects are part of commemoration, but
they are just part and not the whole. Commemoration is a societal
activity, whereas memorialisation is a physical construction project.
Neither commemoration (gathering) or memorialisation (built
structures) inherently require memory. Postwar Canadians did not
oppose public memory or even commemoration, they opposed the
(perceived) superfluous building of monuments and memorials.
From the end of the Second World War, the Canadian government
prioritised overseas commemoration of the conflict over domestic
commemorations of specific battles. Canadian diplomats and
dignitaries were invited to these ceremonies and attended with great
honour. The first overseas ceremony attended by Canadian officials
was a 1946 ceremony in the Netherlands. Considering the special
relationship developed between the Dutch people and Canadian
soldiers during the Second World War, this is perhaps no surprise.15
Each Dutch region and town wanted the opportunity to
commemorate the Canadian soldiers who liberated their area. As such,
there were several ceremonies each year in the first few years after
the war. The duplicative ceremonies suggest that while ceremonies
were planned by Dutch government and military officials, there was
a lack of central coordination. The first of these ceremonies was on
15 April 1946 in Leeuwarden, near the northern coast. Canada’s
Minister in the Netherlands, Pierre Dupuy, was the guest of honour
at the Leeuwarden ceremony, which was an all-day event including
a luncheon, factory visits, a reception and a lecture given by Dupuy
about the relationship between Canada and the Netherlands. After
the ceremony, Dupuy reported to the Secretary of State for External
Affairs that “judging by the enthusiasm shown by the population…

Cook, Fighting for History, 206-10; letter from Charles Foulkes to the UnderSecretary of State for External Affairs, 4 April 1946, RG25 G-2, file 8769-40, LAC;
and Andrew Horrall, “An ‘Eternal Memorial for Canadian Heroes’: The Dutch Town
of Putte Commemorates the Essex Scottish Regiment,” Canadian Military History
20, 3 (Summer 2011): 3–18.
15  

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol31/iss1/5

6

Littlewood: Failure to Launch
LITTLEWOOD

7

the presence of Canadian uniforms and a Canadian representative
was greatly appreciated. This is only the beginning of a long series
of similar occasions, as each town liberated by the Canadians is
anxious to have its turn to celebrate.”16 However, 5 May, the day on
which Canadian soldiers broke into the Netherlands, soon emerged
as the obvious date of commemoration for overseas ceremonies,17
overshadowing both 6 June (D-Day) and 19 August (Dieppe).
The first official ceremony—organised by the Dutch government—
was on 5 May 1946 at the Canadian Military Cemetery at Bergen
op Zoom, chosen because of the high number of Canadian soldiers
buried in that cemetery.18 Dupuy painted a picture of the ceremony
as taking place on sacred soil to commemorate the “most significant
date in Canadian military history.”19 The ceremony was attended by
ambassadors and representatives from Belgium, China, France, the
UK, the US, Brazil, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway,
Poland, Australia and Portugal. Children of the local community had
decorated each grave with flowers prior to the service and several
thousand people were present.20
The ceremony, its organisation, its content, the dignitaries and,
perhaps most significantly, the children present at the service suggest
that the Dutch considered Canada’s contribution to the liberation
of the Netherlands to be important, not only to the expulsion of
the Nazis but to the Netherlands’ very survival. By broadcasting
the ceremony on the radio, organisers made it available for all
Canadians to listen and pay tribute to what their fellow Canadians
did during the war.21 Archival records from the Ministry of External
Affairs indicate that the Canadian government followed the lead
of its European counterparts and commemorated the Liberation
of the Netherlands instead of the Dieppe Raid or the Normandy

Letter from Pierre Dupuy to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 18 April
1946, RG25 G-2, file 8769-40, LAC.
17  
Letter from Pierre Dupuy to N. A. Robertson, 15 March 1946, RG25 G-2, file
8769-40, LAC.
18  
“Bergen-Op-Zoom Canadian Cemetery,” Commonwealth War Graves Commission,
accessed 11 February 2021, https://www.cwgc.org/visit-us/find-cemeteriesmemorials/cemetery-details/2061700/BERGEN-OP-ZOOM%20CANADIAN%20
WAR%20CEMETERY/.
19  
Speech by Pierre Dupuy, 5 May 1946, RG25 G-2, file 8769-40, LAC.
20  
Dispatch No. 251 from Pierre Dupuy to William Lyon Mackenzie King, 6 May
1946, RG25 G-2, file 8769-40, LAC.
21  
Speech by Pierre Dupuy, 5 May 1946, RG25 G-2, file 8769-40, LAC.
16  
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Landings as Canada’s premier commemoration and date of memory
for the Second World War.22 The radio broadcasts further solidified
the Liberation of the Netherlands on the Canadian commemorative
calendar. The commemoration of the Liberation of the Netherlands
as a purely Canadian action is one early example of Canadians’
emerging nationalistic memory of the Second World War. In many
ways, it is logical that the Canadian government chose to prioritise
the Liberation of the Netherlands. The other engagements that
might seem like more natural commemorations—the Dieppe Raid
and D-Day—have a more complicated historical narrative that made
them more difficult to remember in a nationalistic or patriotic way.
Future prime minister John Diefenbaker (at this time an
opposition MP from Saskatchewan) took an early lead spearheading
the memorialisation of the Second World War at home. In 1955,
he made a series of statements which pressured the government to
move forward on a memorial to the dead of the Second World War.
Diefenbaker saw the National War Memorial at Confederation Square
as a memorial to the First World War and did not want its purpose
usurped by the Second World War. Diefenbaker was not alone in
his estimation of the National War Memorial; many commentators,
politicians and public figures noted that the memorial’s imagery and
symbolism were very much reflective of the First World War and
adding another conflict to that would be incongruous. Furthermore,
the Book of Remembrance for the Second World War was nearing
completion and Diefenbaker was concerned that there would be
nowhere appropriate to house the new book.23 The Memorial Chamber
in the Peace Tower in Parliament’s Centre Block—which housed
the Book of Remembrance for the First World War—was dedicated
specifically to the memory of the First World War. Therefore,
Diefenbaker considered it an inappropriate location for Second World
War commemoration.24
In response, the government built the Veterans Memorial
Buildings on Wellington Street in Ottawa in 1956. Chiefly meant as
a government office building, the Veterans Memorial Buildings were
Letter from Pierre Dupuy to WLMK, 6 May 1946, RG25 G-2, file 8769-40, LAC.
A Book of Remembrance is a heavily stylised book containing the names of all
who died in war. One was made after the First World War and similar books have
been created for subsequent wars. They are designed for public display.
24  
Frank Swanson, “Urging War Memorial to Dead of All Wars,” Ottawa Citizen,
31 May 1955.
22  
23  
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also seen as one logical location for the Book of Remembrance. The
Royal Canadian Legion (RCL) opposed the scheme on the grounds
that the buildings would be insufficient memorialisation because of
their dual purpose as office buildings and a memorial.25 The RCL’s
official position was that only aesthetic monuments were suitable
memorials.26 Indeed, one veteran wrote that if the plan went forward,
the Book of Remembrance would be reduced to a “model ship, open
to the gaze of every junior clerk heading for the canteen for the office
gang’s morning coffee.”27
The RCL also considered the Peace Tower to be a memorial only
for the dead of the First World War. As such, a standalone Second
World War monument was still required. RCL leadership called
for the government to erect a monument similar to the cenotaph
in Whitehall, London, UK. RCL Dominion Command wanted the
memorial to be inexpensive so that monies could be spent to further
improve the lives of veterans and Canadians. The theoretical war
memorial that the RCL proposed was not to have a date- or warspecific inscription so that it could be the memorial for all wars, past
and future.28 In response to these calls, the government planned to
start commissioning a new memorial.29
Louis St-Laurent’s Liberal government let the memorial plans
percolate for a year, but when the Progressive Conservative John
Diefenbaker was elected prime minister in 1957, his government took
up the mantle. An advocate for memorial building, Diefenbaker’s
government quickly set to work approving the plan for a large
memorial on Nepean Point, citing the need for a repository for the
newly-completed Book of Remembrance, which had a temporary
home in the Memorial Chamber.30 The architecture firm selected,
Toronto’s Mathers and Haldenby, had no budget; according to the

Ferguson, “Canada’s Response,” 90.
John Hudenvad, Editorial, “Criticism of Plan Answered,” The Legionary (April
1963): 14-15.
27  
Fred R. Inglis, “It’s Time for Action!,” The Legionary (January 1955): 19-21.
28  
“Legion Seeks New Memorial for All Wars,” Ottawa Citizen, 10 November 1955.
29  
Frank Swanson, “Building New War Memorial not Plan of Near Future,” Ottawa
Citizen, 15 March 1956.
30  
Alex Hume, “To Build ‘All-War’ Shrine,” Ottawa Citizen, 12 November 1957; and
“May Place Second Book of the Dead,” Ottawa Citizen, 4 October 1957. That home
was to become permanent.
25  
26  
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Ottawa Citizen, their only task was “to produce perfection.”31 They
designed a church: it was to be 70 feet long, 50-tapering-to-35 feet
wide, 50 feet high and it was to include sculptured figures in “heroic
size of Canadian warriors, down the generations since the beginning
of Canadian history.”32 The memorial was to be topped by a spirelike “sword of service”33 and include a place of prayer.34 The estimated
cost of the memorial was pegged at $600,000 and it was to be placed
prominently on Nepean Point in Ottawa—the current home of the
National Gallery of Canada. The government planned for the national
Remembrance Day ceremony to be moved to the new memorial once
it was finished, which the government expected to be in 1958.35 That
target date soon came and went.
At this point, a few different memorial ideas were conflated into
one design. Early proponents of the Nepean Point memorial, like the
RCL, St-Laurent and Diefenbaker, advocated for a Second World
War memorial in order to properly house the Book of Remembrance
for the Second World War. However, as plans about the memorial
became established, officials wanted a memorial with broader appeal
and less focus on a single conflict. Under such a proposal, the memorial
was to house Books of Remembrance for the South African War,
the Second World War, the newly-concluded Korean War as well as
reproductions of those from the First World War. By September 1958,
newspapers reported that the memorial was also to include those who
died in the North-West Resistance.36
Despite support from the RCL and important government officials
spanning the two major political parties, the federal government
appeared to be reluctant to begin building a Second World War
memorial. When memorialisation plans were announced in 1956, it
was to be completed within two years. With Nepean Point still bare in
1958, Diefenbaker’s government announced that construction would
begin in 1959, but the end of that year came and went and no sod
Charles King, “Cost no Object in Plans for Stark War Memorial,” Ottawa Citizen,
22 November 1957.
32  
J. A. Hume, “$600,000 Memorial ‘On Point,’” Ottawa Citizen, 1 May 1956.
33  
Charles King, “Cost no Object in Plans for Stark War Memorial,” Ottawa Citizen,
2November 1957.
34  
Greg Connolley, “Start Next Year on Memorial at Nepean Point,” Ottawa Citizen,
7 November 1958.
35  
“Nepean Point,” Ottawa Journal, 2 May 1956.
36  
“DVA Checking Design for a New War Memorial,” Ottawa Citizen, 11
September 1958.
31  
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was turned. Indeed, in September 1959, the Department of Public
Works and the Department of Veterans Affairs had only just sent
the memorial plans to the Design Committee of the National Capital
Commission for approval instead of beginning construction. The
government did, however, announce that the price tag had more than
doubled since 1956 and estimated that it would take approximately
a year to build.37 The historical record—newspapers, The Legionary
and archival documents—is silent as to why the memorial fell to the
back burner during this time.
In 1960, the National Capital Commission (NCC) came back
to Cabinet with the recommendation that the memorial be divided:
one memorial building to house the Books of Remembrance and a
separate cenotaph for public ceremonies. The NCC proposed that
the building be erected in Rockcliffe and the cenotaph at Nepean
Point.38 The NCC felt that the scale of the memorial building would
“injuriously affect the fine massing of buildings on Parliament Hill,”
obscure the parliamentary views (which was a protection proposed
in the 1950 Gréber report) and “cause a curious conflict in purpose
with the statue of Champlain who is known to have visited the site.”39
Cabinet decided to continue the original course but to take account
of the NCC’s decision.40
Despite, or maybe because of, the long delay and prevarication
about the new memorial, it was not without controversy. Since the
end of the First World War, war memorials have elicited emotional
and impassioned debates and the post-Second World War period was
no different. The editorial team of the Ottawa Journal made its case
clear. For that conservative-leaning newspaper, the National War
Memorial already in place in Ottawa was sufficient to commemorate
all wars. The Journal advocated for adding dates of the Second
World War—and potentially subsequent wars—to The Response (the
official name for the National War Memorial at Confederation Square)
which would make it more obviously applicable to those service
members.41 If a memorial was necessary, the Journal suggested that
“War Memorial Study Nearing Completion,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 July 1959.
Letter from A. J. Brooks to R. B. Bryce, 5 February 1960, RG2-B2 W-1-1(b), LAC.
39  
National Capital Commission Resolution RE War Memorial Building, RG2-B2
W-1-1(b), LAC.
40  
Record of Cabinet Decision, National Memorial Building and Cenotaph, 20
February 1960, RG2-B2 W-1-1(b), LAC.
41  
“One Memorial,” Editorial, Ottawa Journal, 12 November 1955.
37  
38  
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a utilitarian memorial would be a more suitable way to remember
Canada’s Second World War dead.42
However, the editors of the more liberal Ottawa Citizen thought
that the proposed memorial’s serene location and the ability to
remember all war dead at one location was one of the proposal’s more
positive elements and the editorial team asked its readers to support
the new memorial.43 The newspaper called the initial memorial plans
“sensible” and suggested that the memorial would meet a crucial
need to commemorate the dead of all wars. According to both the
federal government and the Ottawa Citizen, the existing National
War Memorial could not serve as an all-encompassing war memorial
because its imagery and symbolism were so aesthetically tied to the
First World War.44
Despite political and journalistic support, Diefenbaker’s
government struggled to get construction underway. It seems as though
the government, and perhaps Diefenbaker himself, was distracted
from its memorial scheme by other issues. So, in 1961, Diefenbaker
used the upcoming centenary celebrations as a tool to garner support
for the yet-to-be-started war memorial.45 Like King, Diefenbaker saw
commemoration of the Second World War as an opportunity to shape
a Canadian national identity. Newspapers remarked on Canada’s
lack of vigorous patriotism,46 and in the years before the centenary
celebrations, Diefenbaker’s and Pearson’s governments sought to forge
national identity through, in part, advocating for the commemoration
of the Second World War. National identities are forged in public
and the 1960s were an important time for federal governments, both
Conservative and Liberal, in forming Canadian identity.47 Though
Diefenbaker was supportive of the new war memorial on Nepean
Point, it simply was not a priority for his government. Update after
update published in newspapers said that the memorial was in the last
stages of planning and considerations, but the government continued
42  
“Would Not the War Dead Prefer a Useful Memorial,” Editorial, Ottawa Journal,
20 February 1960.
43  
“National Cenotaph on Parliament Hill,” Editorial, Ottawa Citizen, 13 March 1955.
44  
“War Memorial,” Editorial, Ottawa Citizen, 2 May 1956; and Ross Smith, “Site of
Cenotaph a Vexing Question,” Ottawa Journal, 15 March 1956.
45  
“Make Canada’s Centennial Moment to Remember— PM [Prime Minister],”
Ottawa Citizen, 12 May 1961.
46  
José Eduardo Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English
Canada, 1945-71 (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2006), 165.
47  
Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution, 6.
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to drag its feet. Other priorities, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and
the Cold War, and internal party politics put the project on hold.48
Interested citizens expressed their support for or displeasure about
the memorial’s plans and designs in the pages of the Ottawa Journal,
the Ottawa Citizen and in letters to the prime minister, some of
which were preserved by the relevant ministries. On the whole, public
reaction to the newly-revealed war memorial plan was negative. Some
thought it was too ostentatious and that an understated memorial
would be more suitable.49 Most others who voiced their opinions
thought that the Peace Tower and The Response were more than
sufficient to commemorate the Second World War and that a new
memorial would be a waste of taxpayer money.50
Though Diefenbaker lost the 1963 election, the Shrine of
Remembrance (as the church-like memorial came to be called)
remained politically important enough for his rival and successor,
Lester B. Pearson, to continue to support it. The Department of
Veterans Affairs began to receive letters objecting to the memorial
in February 1962. According to the new minister, Roger Teillet, the
letters coincided with comments circulating in Ottawa about a “live
memorial.” Teillet initially dismissed these comments, arguing that
utilitarian memorials (also known as live memorials) “quickly lose their
Remembrance connotation and revert to their utilitarian purpose.” He
felt that the public reaction to the Shrine of Remembrance was based
on a “misunderstanding of the primary function” of the memorial.
Teillet redoubled his commitment to the new memorial building and
cenotaph and was prepared for new proposals to be submitted which
took into account the NCC’s concerns.51
By 1963, the government and design firm Mathers and Haldenby
managed to approve and publish a design. The memorial complex
(Figure 1) was to be a “Remembrance Shrine” and include both a
Cook, The Fight for History, 166.
P. Z. Weinstein “The Proposed New War Memorial,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa
Citizen, 23 February 1963; and P. J. H. Barratt, “War Memorial,” Letter to the
Editor, Ottawa Journal, 23 February 1963.
50  
W. C. Howard, “War Memorial,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa Journal, 27
February 1963; “Planetarium is Proposed,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 February 1963;
“Not Three Memorials,” Editorial, Ottawa Journal, 3 March 1963; E. Girdler, “War
Memorial,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa Citizen, 8 March 1963; and R. B. Morrison,
“War Memorials,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa Journal, 23 March 1963.
51  
Memorandum to Cabinet: The Canadian Shrine of Remembrance, 11 September
1963, RG2-B2 W-1-1(b), LAC.
48  
49  
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Artist’s rendering of the proposed Shrine of Remembrance. [Ottawa Citizen, 20 February
1963]

“Place of Remembrance” and an “Altar of Repose.”52 The interior
was designed to resemble a large chapel. Indeed, the “Place of
Remembrance” was meant to be an altar—an altar in the house of
worship of Canadian identity. Invoking religious language was one
way by which Diefenbaker’s and Pearson’s governments promoted
the new memorial and therefore the sacred nature of the act of
remembering the war dead. Though politicians repeated that the new
war memorial was not meant to usurp The Response in Confederation
Square, the Ottawa Journal reported that the new war memorial
was to be “THE National War Memorial for the Canadian dead of
ALL wars in which Canada had fought.”53 The Second World War
was critical to the national identity that Canadian politicians wanted
to promote; therefore, it was important, and perhaps obvious, that
the memorial to that war was critical to shaping postwar identity.

52  
Richard Jackson, “Cenotaph, Memorial Plans Set,” Ottawa Journal, 20
February 1963.
53  
Richard Jackson, “Cenotaph, Memorial Plans Set,” Ottawa Journal, 20 February
1963. Emphasis in original.
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However, maybe as a recognition of the delay and the public’s
opposition to the memorial, Pearson launched a review of the
monument plans in September 1963. Perhaps he thought a redesign of
the memorial might make the public more supportive.54 While much
of the general public did not support the memorial plans, Pearson’s
government was wholly committed to the Shrine of Remembrance,
much to the delight of the Royal Canadian Legion.55 The editorial
team at the Ottawa Citizen also stood by its earlier decision to back
the memorial,56 but the public continued to be skeptical and critical
of the government’s decision.57
Clearly, both Diefenbaker and Pearson thought that a Second
World War memorial would be an important nation-building symbol
for Canada. The debate concerning the proposed memorial, however,
was not the only contentious issue of nation-building happening in
the early 1960s. Passions rose and national unity and identity were
tried and debated as Canadians determined whether they needed a
new flag to represent a new, modern country.58 Gregory A. Johnson
argues, however, that the standard understanding of Canada’s new
flag was that it was a political and cultural win (and perhaps a
personal one) for Pearson, John Matheson and George Stanley, the
flag’s designers. Recent studies of the flag debate reveal that the
debate was more controversial than that: Pearson used Britain’s
declining imperial influence and prestige after the Second World
War as a moment to create a new national identity underpinned
by a new flag. The Royal Canadian Legion was not impressed by
Pearson’s new flag. He and Matheson pitched their plans at the
Dominion Convention in 1964 and they were “booed and hissed”
out of the meeting and told to “drop dead.” For the RCL, re-

Greg Connolley, “PM Won’t Cancel Nepean Shrine,” Ottawa Citizen, 4 September
1963; and Norman Campbell, “Minister Seeks Reappraisal for Nepean Shrine,”
Ottawa Citizen, 10 October 1963.
55  
“Shrine Delights Legion,” Ottawa Citizen, 8 August 1963.
56  
“A Memorial to Canada’s War Dead,” Editorial, Ottawa Citizen, 7 August 1963.
57  
J. Grant Wanzel, “War Memorial,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa Citizen, 12
August 1963; Zoe Booth, “Living Memorial,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa Journal,
17 August 1963; and M. Mowat, “War Memorial,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa
Citizen, 30 August 1963.
58  
John Ross Matheson, Canada’s Flag: A Search for a Country (Boston: G.K. Hall,
1980), 69.
54  
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designing the flag represented the government’s desire to do away
with their wartime contributions.59
The flag debate and the Shrine of Remembrance plan are both
indicative of a perceived necessity to foster Canadian identity and
national unity prior to the centenary celebrations. While Pearson
won the flag debate, reaction to the memorial proposal continued
to garner a considerable amount of opposition. Doris Anderson, the
editor of Chatelaine, for example, called the proposed memorial
“unimaginative.” She argued that the men who died during the
Second World War were products of the Great Depression and
therefore would not have appreciated a memorial that did not
serve a clear purpose for the common good.60 An Ottawa architect
thought the memorial would fall flat because it failed to reflect
contemporary Canada.61
The RCL’s leadership supported the proposed memorial, but
not all veterans or veterans’ groups liked the memorial plans.
At their annual meeting in 1963, the Naval Officers Associations
of Canada passed a motion—which was forwarded to the prime
minister—opposing the expenditure of $1.5 million for a shrine. It
further supported a “living memorial” such as a scholarship, library
or public building and called on the government to reconsider the
memorial through consultations with a broader section of veterans
than just the RCL.62
There were no letters to the editor of either the Ottawa Citizen
or the Ottawa Journal that supported the proposed Shrine of
Remembrance. It appears that most Canadians felt that if the
nation’s capital truly needed a new war memorial, it would be most
appropriate to have a memorial that would be useful: whether it be a
public building, a library, a scholarship or a park, even a planetarium

Gregory A. Johnson, “The Last Gasp of Empire: The 1964 Flag Debate Revisited,”
in Canada and the End of Empire, ed. Phillip A. Buckner (Vancouver: University of
British Colombia Press, 2005), 232-34.
60  
Doris Anderson, “A Birthday Present We Don’t Need,” From the desk of the
Editor, Chatelaine, October 1963, preserved in MG26 N3, vol. 39, file 189.22, LAC.
61  
Letter from Stig Harvor to Lester B. Pearson, 29 November 1963, MG26 N3, vol.
39, file 189.22, LAC.
62  
Letter from Captain L. B. McIlhagga to Lester B. Pearson, MG26 N3, vol. 39,
file 189.22, LAC.
59  
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was suggested.63 Canadians saw The Response as their war memorial
and did not believe that there was any purpose to be had in erecting
a new, expensive memorial.
The public’s overwhelmingly negative reaction to the proposed
Shrine of Remembrance had an impact on Pearson and his government.
In July 1963, Pearson’s government announced that they were
“reviewing the ‘philosophy’” behind the proposed memorial because
of the opposition from the Canadian population.64 Pearson did not
understand the criticism, but he acknowledged that because of the
public opposition, the memorial decision needed to be “reconsidered
or some effort should be made to explain why the ‘shrine’ is being
erected.”65 Despite the review, Pearson and his cabinet decided to
continue with the memorial as planned.
Notwithstanding non-partisan governmental support, plans for
the new memorial soon fell off the table. The public simply did not
support spending public money on a memorial which was perceived
as unnecessary. The RCL still supported the Shrine of Remembrance
and “deplore[d] the criticism which forced the Government to postpone
its implementation.”66 RCL leadership lobbied the government
throughout the mid-1960s for a new national cenotaph, regardless
of the public’s perception of the plans.67 For the RCL, the Shrine of
Remembrance was integral to the country’s ability to adequately mark
its centennial anniversary.68 The RCL believed that commemorating
the war dead would contribute to the nationalism and patriotism
required to appropriately observe the country’s centennial; it was
through the actions and efforts of those who died at war that Canada’s
achievements would be properly understood.

W. C. Howard, “War Memorial,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa Journal, 27
February 1963; “Planetarium is Proposed,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 February 1963;
“Not Three Memorials,” Editorial, Ottawa Journal, 3 March 1963; E. Girdler, “War
Memorial,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa Citizen, 8 March 1963; and R. B. Morrison,
“War Memorials,” Letter to the Editor, Ottawa Journal, 23 March 1963.
64  
“Govt. Reviews Plans for New War Memorial,” Ottawa Citizen, 23 July 1963.
65  
LBP’s marginalia on Record of Cabinet Decision, 25 July 1963, annotation by
Lester B. Pearson, RG2-B2 W-1-1(b), LAC.
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Royal Canadian Legion Brief Presented to the Prime Minister of Canada and the
Cabinet, 11 November 1964, MG28 I298, box 53, file 11, LAC.
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6, MG28 I298, box 53, file 11, LAC.
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Even the Royal Canadian Legion was not a monolith and there
were differing opinions about the Shrine of Remembrance. Different
veterans’ groups amalgamated to form the RCL in the 1920s and
that patchwork led to significant diversity between different branches
and regions. In its spring 1966 meeting, the Ontario Command of
the RCL passed a motion which instructed the Dominion Command
to “vigorously oppose the expenditure” of millions of dollars for a
memorial in Ottawa when many veterans were “in dire circumstances
with regard to food, lodging and medical attention.”69 The Valour Road
Memorial Branch in Winnipeg also opposed the memorial, calling it
a wasteful expenditure of funds.70 This was also the sentiment of the
general public at the time. In the 1920s and 1930s, Canadians had
done a comprehensive job of building memorials to commemorate
the war dead and for many 1960s Canadians, new memorials were a
waste of public money.
Because of public opposition to the memorial, the government
quietly and permanently abandoned the plans sometime in 1966
or 1967. This was a defeat for the politicians who wanted to use
commemoration of the Second World War as a nation-building
tool. Canadians were keen to commemorate the Second World
War—widespread attendance at Remembrance Day ceremonies was
evidence of that, as was Canadians’ engagement with the memorial
question—but they did not want the government to spend taxpayer
money on a memorial because there were already suitable methods of
memorialisation. Nation-building and national identity were important
for Canadians, but the opposition to the Shrine of Remembrance
makes it clear Canadians had to be on board with the method by
which national identity would be fostered.
While national identity may be conceptualised by politicians
and other elites, those creations are doomed to failure if the general
public does not also accept what has been established.71 St-Laurent,
Diefenbaker and Pearson were slow to realise that Canadians did not
want public money spent on a new war memorial and therefore that
they did not have the power or authority to foist national identities

Memorandum from Murray MacFarlane to D. M. Thompson, 16 March 1966,
MG28 I298, box 53, file 11, LAC.
70  
Letter from Richard A. Smith to Gordon Churchill, 12 January 1965, MG28 I298,
box 53, file 11, LAC.
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wholesale onto the Canadian population. The Second World War is
often seen as a turning point in Canadian nationalism and national
identity: Canadians were proud of “their” efforts in the war and
that pride manifested in the public pushing the government to
redefine and reaffirm the country’s identity. That does not mean
that Canadians wanted to sever ideological ties with Britain, quite
the opposite, and Diefenbaker’s 1957 election was evidence of that
fact. However, the social and political revolutions of the 1960s gave
the Canadian people the space to assert their will more forcefully.72
The debate over the Shrine of Remembrance demonstrates that the
1960s brought Canadians to a place wherein they wanted to define
themselves rather than being told by the government and other elites
how to identify.
Successive Canadian governments failed to launch a new
memorial to the Second World War, but they did commemorate the
war with the introduction of a variety of social programs for veterans,
including education, housing and healthcare programs. This is an
argument that has been made before, namely in a short book review
by Jonathan Vance,73 but it remains an important point to make.
Commemoration is more than standing at a cenotaph ceremony, even
if that is an important societal act. To pay due commemoration to
those who died in the Second World War, one must improve the society
which emerged in its wake. This is what veteran social programs did.
In a poll taken during the Second World War, two-thirds of
the population thought that the federal government had a duty to
provide better treatment to veterans of the Second World War than
they had to veterans a generation earlier. The post-First World War
Department of Soldiers’ Civil Reestablishment, designed to help
former servicemen re-integrate into civil society, was plagued with
problems: pensions were complicated and insufficient, employment
services were under-resourced, and injured service members were

Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, “Introduction,” in Canada and the
British World: Culture, Migration, and Identity, ed. R. D. Francis and Phillip A.
Buckner (Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2006), 1-3.
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Canadian and American History and Memory, by Robert Teigrob,” University of
Toronto Quarterly 87, 3 (Summer 2018): 325-27.
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inadequately taken care of.74 Indeed, outside the Veterans Memorial
Buildings on Wellington Street in Ottawa, there is a plaque erected
by the National Capital Commission that explicitly links the social
welfare programs to the societal act of remembering the Second
World War.75 With this argument in mind, it is difficult to accept the
notion that Canadian’s efforts during the Second World War went
un-remembered.
If we compare commemoration and memorialisation directly to
what was done after the First World War, the 1939-1945 conflict
will seem woefully, and perhaps shamefully, forgotten. However,
remembering the war dead is more than stone monuments and silent
crowds. It is also the act of change and betterment of society. It
was, in part, thanks to service members’ activities during the Second
World War that many of these social changes were developed and
soon they were extended to non-veterans as part of promises to ensure
the welfare of the whole Canadian population. Indeed, Alvin Finkel
argues that “wartime sacrifices strengthened Canadians’ convictions
that their governments owed them guarantees of decent incomes, free
medical care, and old age pension.”76 Of course, few political policies
or issues respond to only one problem, but it is clear that from the
sacrifices of the Second World War came a desire for a better world,
one that would be provided, at least in part, by social programming,
of which Canadians remain proud of well into the twenty-first century.
Tim Cook argues that Canadians have been derelict in their duty
to commemorate the Second World War.77 However, in problematising
commemoration and memorialisation and suggesting a different way
to consider how a society remembers its war dead, it is clear that
the Canadian government was keen to pay tribute to those who died
in the Second World War. It seems that the Canadian population
also wanted to commemorate the conflict, but were concerned about
the public expenditure of funds for a memorial which many saw as
Jeff Keshen, “Getting It Right the Second Time Around: The Reintegration of
Canadian Veterans of World War II,” in The Veterans Charter and Post-World War
II Canada, ed. J. L. Granatstein and Peter Neary (Montreal & Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 1998), 62-64.
75  
“Memorial Buildings and Arch,” Canadian Military Memorials Database, Veterans
Affairs Canada, 25 February 2022, https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/
memorials/national-inventory-canadian-memorials/details/9219.
76  
Alvin Finkel, Social Policy and Practice in Canada: A History (Waterloo: Wilfrid
Laurier University Press, 2006), 143.
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duplicative. In response to public opinion, the federal government
focused its postwar funds on social programs for veterans which were
then expanded to the broader population. Canadians of the postwar
period did not forget the Second World War or the people that died
in it. Instead of building war memorials, they focused on building
a society worth the deaths of the war. This more holistic approach
is non-traditional, but it suggests that Canadians of the 1960s felt
differently about memorialisation, commemoration and remembering
war than their parents did. This is not a value judgement about
which generation remembered war better. It is merely to suggest that
when considered from a broader perspective, the commemorative
approaches of the 1960s are due more consideration than they have
been traditionally given.
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